Report_from_Iron_Mountain

 
for individual human violence, but itself in turn serves to rationalize most
nonmilitary killing. It also provides the precedent for the collective willingness
of members of a society to pay a blood price for institutions far less central to
social organization that war. To take a handy example..."rather than accept
speed limits of twenty miles an hour we prefer to let automobiles kill forty
thousand people a year." A Rand analyst puts it in more general terms and less
rhetorically: "I am sure that there is, in effect, a desirable level of automobile
accidents---desirable, that is, from a broad point of view; in the sense that it is a
necessary concomitant of things of greater value to society." The point may
seem too obvious for iteration, but it is essential to an understanding of the
important motivational function of war as a model for collective sacrifice.
 
A brief look at some defunct premodern societies is instructive. One of the most
noteworthy features common to the larger, more complex, and more successful
of ancient civilizations was their widespread use of the blood sacrifice. If one
were to limit consideration to those cultures whose regional hegemony was so
complete that the prospect of "war" had become virtually inconceivable ---as
was the case with several of the great pre-Columbian societies of the Western
Hemisphere---it would be found that some form of ritual killing occupied a
position of paramount social importance in each. Invariably, the ritual was
invested with mythic or religious significance; as will all religious and totemic
practice, however, the ritual masked a broader and more important social
function.
 
In these societies, the blood sacrifice served the purpose of maintaining a
vestigial "earnest" of the society's capability and willingness to make war-- i.e.,
kill and be killed---in the event that some mystical--i.e., unforeseen --
circumstance were to give rise to the possibility. That the "earnest" was not an
adequate substitute for genuine military organization when the unthinkable
enemy, such as the Spanish conquistadores, actually appeared on the scene in
no way negates the function of the ritual. It was primarily, if not exclusively, a
symbolic reminder that war had once been the central organizing force of the
society, and that this condition might recur.
 
It does not follow that a transition to total peace in modern societies would
require the use of this model, even in less "barbaric" guise. But the historical
analogy serves as a reminder that a viable substitute for war as a social system
cannot be a mere symbolic charade. It must involve risk of real personal
destruction, and on a scale consistent with the size and complexity of modern
social systems. Credibility is the key. Whether the substitute is ritual in nature
or functionally substantive, unless it provides a believable life- and-death threat
it will not serve the socially organizing function of war.