But the principal cause for concern over the continuing effectiveness of the war
system, and the more important reason for hedging with peace planning, lies in
the backwardness of current war-system programming. Its controls have not
kept pace with the technological advances it has made possible. Despite its
unarguable success to date, even in this era of unprecedented potential in mass
destruction, it continues to operate largely on a laissez-faire basis. To the best of
our knowledge, no serious quantified studies have even been conducted to
determine, for example:
---optimum levels of armament production, for purposes of economic control, at
any given relationship between civilian production and consumption patterns:
---correlation factors between draft recruitment policies and mensurable social
dissidence;
---minimum levels of population destruction necessary to maintain war-threat
credibility under varying political conditions;
---optimum cyclical frequency of "shooting" wars under varying circumstances
of historical relationship.
These and other war-function factors are fully susceptible to analysis by today's
computer-based systems, but they have not been so treated; modern analytical
techniques have up to now been relegated to such aspects of the ostensible
functions of war as procurement, personnel deployment, weapons analysis, and
the like. We do not disparage these types of application, but only deplore their
lack of utilization to greater capacity in attacking problems of broader scope.
Our concern for efficiency in this context is not aesthetic, economic, or
humanistic. It stems from the axiom that no system can long survive at either
input or output levels that consistently or substantially deviate from an optimum
range. As their data grow increasingly sophisticated, the war system and its
functions are increasingly endangered by such deviations.
Our final conclusion, therefore, is that it will be necessary for our government
to plan in depth for two general contingencies. The first, and lesser, is the
possibility of a viable general peace; the second is the successful continuation
of the war system. In our view, careful preparation for the possibility of peace
should be extended, not because we take the position that the end of war would
necessarily be desirable, if it is in fact possible, but because it may be thrust
upon us in some form whether we are ready for it or not. Planning for
rationalizing and quantifying the war system, on the other hand, to ensure the
system, and the more important reason for hedging with peace planning, lies in
the backwardness of current war-system programming. Its controls have not
kept pace with the technological advances it has made possible. Despite its
unarguable success to date, even in this era of unprecedented potential in mass
destruction, it continues to operate largely on a laissez-faire basis. To the best of
our knowledge, no serious quantified studies have even been conducted to
determine, for example:
---optimum levels of armament production, for purposes of economic control, at
any given relationship between civilian production and consumption patterns:
---correlation factors between draft recruitment policies and mensurable social
dissidence;
---minimum levels of population destruction necessary to maintain war-threat
credibility under varying political conditions;
---optimum cyclical frequency of "shooting" wars under varying circumstances
of historical relationship.
These and other war-function factors are fully susceptible to analysis by today's
computer-based systems, but they have not been so treated; modern analytical
techniques have up to now been relegated to such aspects of the ostensible
functions of war as procurement, personnel deployment, weapons analysis, and
the like. We do not disparage these types of application, but only deplore their
lack of utilization to greater capacity in attacking problems of broader scope.
Our concern for efficiency in this context is not aesthetic, economic, or
humanistic. It stems from the axiom that no system can long survive at either
input or output levels that consistently or substantially deviate from an optimum
range. As their data grow increasingly sophisticated, the war system and its
functions are increasingly endangered by such deviations.
Our final conclusion, therefore, is that it will be necessary for our government
to plan in depth for two general contingencies. The first, and lesser, is the
possibility of a viable general peace; the second is the successful continuation
of the war system. In our view, careful preparation for the possibility of peace
should be extended, not because we take the position that the end of war would
necessarily be desirable, if it is in fact possible, but because it may be thrust
upon us in some form whether we are ready for it or not. Planning for
rationalizing and quantifying the war system, on the other hand, to ensure the
