It seems clear that Mr. McNamara and other proponents of the peace-corps
surrogate for this tar function lean heavily on the success of the paramilitary
Depression programs mentioned in the last section. We find the precedent
wholly inadequate in degree. Neither the lack of relevant precedent, however,
nor the dubious social welfare sentimentality characterizing this approach
warrant its rejection without careful study. It may be viable --- provided, first,
that the military origin of the Corps format be effectively rendered out of its
operational activity, and second, that the transition from paramilitary activities
to "developmental w? A" can be effected without regard to the attitudes of the
Corps personnel or to the "value" of the work it is expected to perform.
Another possible surrogate for the control of potential enemies of society is the
reintroduction, in some form consistent with modern technology and political
processes, of slavery. Up to now, this has been suggested only in fiction,
notably in the works of Wells, Huxley, Orwell, and others engaged in the
imaginative anticipation of the sociology of the future. But the fantasies
projected in Brave New World and 1984 have seemed less and less implausible
over the years since their publication. The traditional association of slavery with
ancient preindustrial cultures should not blind us to its adaptability to advanced
forms of social organization, nor should its equally traditional incompatibility
with Western moral and economic values. It is entirely possible that the
development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be an absolute prerequisite
for social control in a world at peace. As a practical matter, conversion of the
code of military discipline to a euphemized form of enslavement would entail
surprisingly little revision; the logical first step would be the adoption of some
form of "universal" military service.
When it comes to postulating a credible substitute for war capable of directing
human behavior patterns in behalf of social organization, few options suggest
themselves. Like its political function, the motivational function of war requires
the existence of a genuinely menacing social enemy. The principal difference is
that for purposes of motivating basic allegiance, as distinct from accepting
political authority, the "alternate enemy" must imply a more immediate,
tangible, and directly felt threat of destruction. It must justify the need for
taking and paying a "blood price" in wide areas of human concern.
In this respect, the possible enemies noted earlier would be insufficient. One
exception might be the environmental-pollution model, if the danger to society
it posed was genuinely imminent. The fictive models would have to carry the
weight of extraordinary conviction, underscored with a not inconsiderable
actual sacrifice of life; the construction of an up-to-date mythological or
surrogate for this tar function lean heavily on the success of the paramilitary
Depression programs mentioned in the last section. We find the precedent
wholly inadequate in degree. Neither the lack of relevant precedent, however,
nor the dubious social welfare sentimentality characterizing this approach
warrant its rejection without careful study. It may be viable --- provided, first,
that the military origin of the Corps format be effectively rendered out of its
operational activity, and second, that the transition from paramilitary activities
to "developmental w? A" can be effected without regard to the attitudes of the
Corps personnel or to the "value" of the work it is expected to perform.
Another possible surrogate for the control of potential enemies of society is the
reintroduction, in some form consistent with modern technology and political
processes, of slavery. Up to now, this has been suggested only in fiction,
notably in the works of Wells, Huxley, Orwell, and others engaged in the
imaginative anticipation of the sociology of the future. But the fantasies
projected in Brave New World and 1984 have seemed less and less implausible
over the years since their publication. The traditional association of slavery with
ancient preindustrial cultures should not blind us to its adaptability to advanced
forms of social organization, nor should its equally traditional incompatibility
with Western moral and economic values. It is entirely possible that the
development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be an absolute prerequisite
for social control in a world at peace. As a practical matter, conversion of the
code of military discipline to a euphemized form of enslavement would entail
surprisingly little revision; the logical first step would be the adoption of some
form of "universal" military service.
When it comes to postulating a credible substitute for war capable of directing
human behavior patterns in behalf of social organization, few options suggest
themselves. Like its political function, the motivational function of war requires
the existence of a genuinely menacing social enemy. The principal difference is
that for purposes of motivating basic allegiance, as distinct from accepting
political authority, the "alternate enemy" must imply a more immediate,
tangible, and directly felt threat of destruction. It must justify the need for
taking and paying a "blood price" in wide areas of human concern.
In this respect, the possible enemies noted earlier would be insufficient. One
exception might be the environmental-pollution model, if the danger to society
it posed was genuinely imminent. The fictive models would have to carry the
weight of extraordinary conviction, underscored with a not inconsiderable
actual sacrifice of life; the construction of an up-to-date mythological or
