are equally irrelevant; any condition of genuine total peace, however achieved,
would be destabilizing until proved otherwise.
If it were necessary at this moment to opt irrevocably for the retention or for the
dissolution of the war system, common prudence would dictate the former
course. But it is not yet necessary, late as the hour appears. And more factors
must eventually enter the war-peace equation than even the most determined
search for alternative institutions for the functions of war can be expected to
reveal. One group of such factors has been given only passing mention in this
Report; it centers around the possible obsolescence of the war system itself. We
have noted, for instance, the limitations of the war system in filling its
ecological function and the declining importance of this aspect of war. It by no
means stretches the imagination to visualize comparable developments which
may compromise the efficacy of war as, for example, an economic controller or
as an organizer of social allegiance. This kind of possibility, however remote,
serves as a reminder that all calculations of contingency not only involve the
weighing of one group of risks against another, but require a respectful
allowance for error on both sides of the scale.
More expedient reason for pursuing the investigation of alternate ways and
means to serve the current functions of war is narrowly political. It is possible
that one or more major sovereign nations may arrive, through ambiguous
leadership, at a position in which a ruling administrative class may lose control
of basic public opinion or of its ability to rationalize a desired war. It is not hard
to imagine, in such circumstances, a situation in which such governments may
feel forced to initiate serious full-scale disarmament proceedings (perhaps
provoked by "accidental" nuclear explosions), and that such negotiations may
lead to the actual disestablishment of military institutions. As our Report has
made clear, this could be catastrophic. It seems evident that, in the event an
important part of the world is suddenly plunged without sufficient warning into
an inadvertent peace, even partial and inadequate preparation for the possibility
may be better than none. The difference could even be critical. The models
considered in the preceding chapter, both those that seem promising and those
that do not, have one positive feature in common--an inherent flexibility of
phasing. And despite our strictures against knowingly proceeding into peace-
transition procedures without thorough substantive preparation, our government
must nevertheless be ready to move in this direction with whatever limited
resources of planning are on hand at the time---if circumstances so require>. An
arbitrary all-or-nothing approach is no more realistic in the development of
contingency peace programming than it is anywhere else.
would be destabilizing until proved otherwise.
If it were necessary at this moment to opt irrevocably for the retention or for the
dissolution of the war system, common prudence would dictate the former
course. But it is not yet necessary, late as the hour appears. And more factors
must eventually enter the war-peace equation than even the most determined
search for alternative institutions for the functions of war can be expected to
reveal. One group of such factors has been given only passing mention in this
Report; it centers around the possible obsolescence of the war system itself. We
have noted, for instance, the limitations of the war system in filling its
ecological function and the declining importance of this aspect of war. It by no
means stretches the imagination to visualize comparable developments which
may compromise the efficacy of war as, for example, an economic controller or
as an organizer of social allegiance. This kind of possibility, however remote,
serves as a reminder that all calculations of contingency not only involve the
weighing of one group of risks against another, but require a respectful
allowance for error on both sides of the scale.
More expedient reason for pursuing the investigation of alternate ways and
means to serve the current functions of war is narrowly political. It is possible
that one or more major sovereign nations may arrive, through ambiguous
leadership, at a position in which a ruling administrative class may lose control
of basic public opinion or of its ability to rationalize a desired war. It is not hard
to imagine, in such circumstances, a situation in which such governments may
feel forced to initiate serious full-scale disarmament proceedings (perhaps
provoked by "accidental" nuclear explosions), and that such negotiations may
lead to the actual disestablishment of military institutions. As our Report has
made clear, this could be catastrophic. It seems evident that, in the event an
important part of the world is suddenly plunged without sufficient warning into
an inadvertent peace, even partial and inadequate preparation for the possibility
may be better than none. The difference could even be critical. The models
considered in the preceding chapter, both those that seem promising and those
that do not, have one positive feature in common--an inherent flexibility of
phasing. And despite our strictures against knowingly proceeding into peace-
transition procedures without thorough substantive preparation, our government
must nevertheless be ready to move in this direction with whatever limited
resources of planning are on hand at the time---if circumstances so require>. An
arbitrary all-or-nothing approach is no more realistic in the development of
contingency peace programming than it is anywhere else.
