costing as much as x hospitals or y schools or z homes takes on a very different
meaning if there are to be more battleships or ICBM's.
Since the list is general, we have elected to forestall the tangential controversy
that surrounds arbitrary cost projections by offering no individual cost
estimates. But the maximum program that could be physically effected along
the lines indicated could approach the established level of military spending
only for a limited time--in our opinion, subject to a detailed cost-and-feasibility
analysis, less than ten years. In this short period, at this rate, the major goals of
the program would have been achieved. Its capital-investment phase would
have been completed, and it would have established a permanent comparatively
modest level of annual operating cost--within the framework of the general
economy.
Here is the basic weakness of the social-welfare surrogate. On the short-term
basis, a maximum program of this sort could replace a normal military spending
program, provided it was designed, like the military model, to be subject to
arbitrary control. Public housing starts, for example, or the development of
modern medical centers might be accelerated or halted from time to time, as the
requirements of a stable economy might dictate. But on the long-term basis,
social-welfare spending, no matter how often redefined, would necessarily
become an integral, accepted part of the economy, of no more value as a
stabilizer than the automobile industry or old age and survivors' insurance.
Apart from whatever merit social-welfare programs are deemed to have for their
own sake, their function as a substitute for war in the economy would thus be
self-liquidating. They might serve, however, as expedients pending the
development of more durable substitute measures.
Another economic surrogate that has been proposed is a series of giant "space
research" programs. These have already demonstrated their utility in more
modest scale within the military economy. What has been implied, although not
yet expressly put forth, is the development of a long-range sequence of space-
research projects with largely unattainable goals. This kind of program offers
several advantages lacking in the social welfare model. First, it is unlikely to
phase itself out, regardless of the predictable "surprises" science has in store for
us: the universe is too big. In the event some individual project unexpectedly
succeeds there would be no dearth of substitute problems. For example, if
colonization of the moon proceeds on schedule, it could then become
"necessary" to establish a beachhead on Mars or Jupiter, and so on. Second, it
need be no more dependent on the general supply-demand economy than its
military prototype. Third, it lends itself extraordinarily well to arbitrary control.
meaning if there are to be more battleships or ICBM's.
Since the list is general, we have elected to forestall the tangential controversy
that surrounds arbitrary cost projections by offering no individual cost
estimates. But the maximum program that could be physically effected along
the lines indicated could approach the established level of military spending
only for a limited time--in our opinion, subject to a detailed cost-and-feasibility
analysis, less than ten years. In this short period, at this rate, the major goals of
the program would have been achieved. Its capital-investment phase would
have been completed, and it would have established a permanent comparatively
modest level of annual operating cost--within the framework of the general
economy.
Here is the basic weakness of the social-welfare surrogate. On the short-term
basis, a maximum program of this sort could replace a normal military spending
program, provided it was designed, like the military model, to be subject to
arbitrary control. Public housing starts, for example, or the development of
modern medical centers might be accelerated or halted from time to time, as the
requirements of a stable economy might dictate. But on the long-term basis,
social-welfare spending, no matter how often redefined, would necessarily
become an integral, accepted part of the economy, of no more value as a
stabilizer than the automobile industry or old age and survivors' insurance.
Apart from whatever merit social-welfare programs are deemed to have for their
own sake, their function as a substitute for war in the economy would thus be
self-liquidating. They might serve, however, as expedients pending the
development of more durable substitute measures.
Another economic surrogate that has been proposed is a series of giant "space
research" programs. These have already demonstrated their utility in more
modest scale within the military economy. What has been implied, although not
yet expressly put forth, is the development of a long-range sequence of space-
research projects with largely unattainable goals. This kind of program offers
several advantages lacking in the social welfare model. First, it is unlikely to
phase itself out, regardless of the predictable "surprises" science has in store for
us: the universe is too big. In the event some individual project unexpectedly
succeeds there would be no dearth of substitute problems. For example, if
colonization of the moon proceeds on schedule, it could then become
"necessary" to establish a beachhead on Mars or Jupiter, and so on. Second, it
need be no more dependent on the general supply-demand economy than its
military prototype. Third, it lends itself extraordinarily well to arbitrary control.
