Nor, simple because we have not discussed them, do we minimize the massive
reconciliation of conflicting interests with domestic as well as international
agreement on proceeding toward genuine peace presupposes. This factor was
excluded from the purview of our assignment, but we would be remiss if we
failed to take it into account. Although no insuperable obstacle lies in the path
of reaching such general agreements, formidable short-term private-group and
general-class interest in maintaining the war system is well established and
widely recognized. The resistance to peace stemming from such interest is only
tangential, in the long run, to the basic functions of war, but it will not be easily
overcome, in this country or elsewhere. Some observers, in fact, believe that it
cannot be overcome at all in our time, that the price of peace is, simply, too
high. This bears on our overall conclusions to the extent that timing in the
transference to substitute institutions may often be the critical factor in their
political feasibility.
It is uncertain, at this time, whether peace will ever be possible. It is far more
questionable, by the objective standard of continued social survival rather than
that of emotional pacifism, that it would be desirable even if it were
demonstrably attainable. The war system, for all its subjective repugnance to
important sections of "public opinion" has demonstrated its effectiveness since
the beginning of recorded history; it has provided the basis for the development
of many impressively durable civilizations, including that which is dominant
today. It has consistently provided unambiguous social priorities. It is, on the
whole, a known quantity. A viable system of peace, assuming that the great and
complex questions of substitute institutions raised in this Report are both
soluble and solved, would still constitute a venture into the unknown, with the
inevitable risks attendant on the unforeseen, however small and however well
hedged.
Government decision-makers tend to choose peace over war whenever a real
option exists, because it usually appears to be the "safer" choice. Under most
immediate circumstances they are likely to be right. But in terms of long-range
social stability, the opposite is true. At our present state of knowledge and
reasonable inference, it is the war system that must be identified with stability,
the peace system that must be identified with social speculation, however
justifiable the speculation may appear, in terms of subjective moral or
emotional values. A nuclear physicist once remarked, in respect to a possible
disarmament agreement: "If we could change the world into a world in which
no weapons could be made, that would be stabilizing. But agreements we can
expect with the Soviets would be destabilizing." The qualification and the bias
reconciliation of conflicting interests with domestic as well as international
agreement on proceeding toward genuine peace presupposes. This factor was
excluded from the purview of our assignment, but we would be remiss if we
failed to take it into account. Although no insuperable obstacle lies in the path
of reaching such general agreements, formidable short-term private-group and
general-class interest in maintaining the war system is well established and
widely recognized. The resistance to peace stemming from such interest is only
tangential, in the long run, to the basic functions of war, but it will not be easily
overcome, in this country or elsewhere. Some observers, in fact, believe that it
cannot be overcome at all in our time, that the price of peace is, simply, too
high. This bears on our overall conclusions to the extent that timing in the
transference to substitute institutions may often be the critical factor in their
political feasibility.
It is uncertain, at this time, whether peace will ever be possible. It is far more
questionable, by the objective standard of continued social survival rather than
that of emotional pacifism, that it would be desirable even if it were
demonstrably attainable. The war system, for all its subjective repugnance to
important sections of "public opinion" has demonstrated its effectiveness since
the beginning of recorded history; it has provided the basis for the development
of many impressively durable civilizations, including that which is dominant
today. It has consistently provided unambiguous social priorities. It is, on the
whole, a known quantity. A viable system of peace, assuming that the great and
complex questions of substitute institutions raised in this Report are both
soluble and solved, would still constitute a venture into the unknown, with the
inevitable risks attendant on the unforeseen, however small and however well
hedged.
Government decision-makers tend to choose peace over war whenever a real
option exists, because it usually appears to be the "safer" choice. Under most
immediate circumstances they are likely to be right. But in terms of long-range
social stability, the opposite is true. At our present state of knowledge and
reasonable inference, it is the war system that must be identified with stability,
the peace system that must be identified with social speculation, however
justifiable the speculation may appear, in terms of subjective moral or
emotional values. A nuclear physicist once remarked, in respect to a possible
disarmament agreement: "If we could change the world into a world in which
no weapons could be made, that would be stabilizing. But agreements we can
expect with the Soviets would be destabilizing." The qualification and the bias
